

The Reception of Bodin

Edited by

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CHAPTER SEVEN

BODIN IN THE NETHERLANDS

Jan Machielsen*

Much like the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, discussed in the chapter by Robert von Friedeburg, the political system of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces did not readily conform to the demands of Bodinian political theory. Historians, most notably Martin van Gelderen, have stressed the distinctive character of Dutch political thought. Bodin's concept of indivisible sovereignty was a foreign idea, propagated in the Republic only, or so it seems, by foreigners.¹ Neither a democracy, an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, the Republic was the quintessence of the "mixed" form of governance that Bodinian political thought disallowed. This chapter will not chart the long-term reception of Bodin's ideas in the Low Countries, where they did not in the long run find fertile ground. Rather, it will examine evidence of Bodin's influence on two political pamphlets of the late 1570s. It will also explore *Bodin's* reception of the Revolt, as an eye witness at its most crucial stage when the rebels gave up on the idea that a new sovereign could be found.

* Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Low Countries History Seminar in London in 2009 and, of course, the 'Reception of Bodin' Workshop in Hull in 2011. I am grateful for the constructive criticism of all those present. Thanks are also due to Monica Stensland who provided me with her list of loyalist pamphlets that in part set me on this trail, to Malcolm Walsby of the French Vernacular Book Project for helping me locate copies of the pamphlets involved, and to Robin Briggs and Noel Malcolm who commented on drafts of this chapter. I owe a special debt to Howell Lloyd for his comments on successive drafts of both the original paper and the present text.

¹ In Martin van Gelderen's classic study, the influence of Jean Bodin is limited to figures around the Duke of Anjou and the Earl of Leicester: Martin van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555–1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 180, 203. Following Quentin Skinner, Van Gelderen argues that the distinction between the political theories of Bodin (and others) and the political thought implicit in Dutch pamphlets is a false one: *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, 3–4. For the same point, but with a very useful distinction between political thought in theory and practice: M. E. H. N. Mout, "Van arm vaderland tot eendrachtige republiek: De rol van politieke theoriën in de Nederlandse Opstand", *Bijdragen en mededelingen tot de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 101 (1986): 345–65, especially 348 and her conclusion on 365 that the speed of events meant theorists (such as Justus Lipsius) were always one step behind.

Crucially, however, these events were not on the horizon when, in the summer of 1576, the privilege for the publication of Bodin's *Les Six livres de la république* was granted.² Although Bodin was certainly not blind to the events that unfolded across the border from Laon where he had just married and would in due course reside, few would have dreamt of or foreseen the rejection of a king that was gradually to take place there—at least, few outside the two rebel provinces of Holland and Zeeland.³ Yet, by November, the fifteen loyalist provinces had made common cause with the rebels against mutinous Spanish soldiers. Unity proved short-lived; among the many called upon to help preserve it was Bodin's patron, the Duke of Anjou. Anjou's first attempt during the second half of 1578, as "Defender of the Liberty of the Netherlands", proved a miserable and short-lived failure.⁴ His second attempt in 1582–83 saw him elected Duke of Brabant and Count of Flanders. This stay was more durable but memorable only for the wrong reasons.⁵

It was as a member of Anjou's entourage during this second period that Bodin met William of Orange and Philip Marnix, Orange's councillor and propagandist. With Orange, Bodin discussed the recent attack on the Prince's life and pondered explanations of the latter's survival, in his forty-ninth year, as well as the recent death of the Prince's wife, in her thirty-sixth year, in terms of number mysticism.⁶ He observed that the attack had deprived Orange of his sense of taste.⁷ When Anjou made his Joyous Entry into Ghent in August 1582, Bodin discussed with the people their ill-fated 1539 rebellion against Charles V: "the Emperor's judgment [of the

² Jean Bodin, *Les Six livres de la république* (Paris, 1576), sig. a1vo. The privilege was granted on 12 August 1576. All future references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1576 edition.

³ Amongst Bodin's contacts were one "marchant d'Anvers" and a "chevalier Espagnol": Bodin, *République* (1576), 632, 130.

⁴ Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93–112; Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 191–92.

⁵ Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, 166–200; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 205–6.

⁶ Jean Bodin, *De republica libri sex* (Lyon, 1586), 421. Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to the Latin text are to this version. Bodin attributes, rather doubtfully, the origins of this number mysticism ($7 \times 7 = 49$; $6 \times 6 = 36$) to the Prince of Orange himself: "quod scribendum non putarem nisi ab principe Aurasio id accepissem cum Antverpiae Francisco duci a consiliis essem". Charlotte de Bourbon died on 5 May 1582.

⁷ Ann Blair, *The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 102–3 (citing a passage from Bodin's *Universae naturae theatrum*); I would suggest that both anecdotes derive from the same meeting.

rebels], I learned from the people of Ghent, when I was on the council of François, Duke of Anjou and the Low Countries".⁸

Differences between the French and Latin versions of the *République* have often been noted, and Bodin's personal political experience at Anjou's side, vaunted in the new letter prefacing the 1586 version, has a role in accounting for them.⁹ Bodin had also responded to, and silently incorporated, some of the criticisms levelled at the original French text—notably Auger Ferrier's comments on Bodin's astrological conjectures.¹⁰ There was a notable change in personal circumstances as well. In 1576, Bodin had been a leading participant in the French Estates-General, in personal attendance upon the king: he was truly a rising star.¹¹ By November 1584 when, in the wake of Anjou's death, Bodin composed the preface of his Latin translation, that star had fallen and had burnt out.¹² Given Bodin's personal experience, as Kenneth McRae has noted, "we ought to marvel that the differences between the two versions are no greater than they actually are".¹³ But McRae did detect some differences in doctrine. One of these, the complete impossibility of sharing sovereignty between prince and people, originally seen as a form of popular government, appears a direct result of Bodin's unhappy experiences in the Netherlands.¹⁴ His increasing belief in divine retribution and his discovery that princes had an obligation to protect foreign visitors may also reflect Bodin's experiences in foreign parts.

⁸ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 341: "sententiam ipsius Imperatoris a Gandanis accepimus cum Francisco Andium ac Belgarum Duci a consiliis essemus". Given Bodin's presence alongside Anjou, this discussion can have taken place only during the Duke's Joyous Entry. Anjou made his Entry into Ghent on 20 August 1582 and stayed until the end of the month. See the official account: Lucas d'Heere, *L'Entree magnifique de Monseigneur Francoys... faite en sa metropolitaine & fameuse ville de Gand le XX^{me} d'Aoust, anno 1582* (Rouen, 1582).

⁹ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), sig. a2vo. It was also during his stay with Anjou in England that Bodin became aware of the popularity of the work and the difficulty experienced by Cambridge scholars of reading the *République* in French.

¹⁰ Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, trans. Richard Knolles, ed. Kenneth McRae (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), A34. On Bodin's relations with Ferrier see above, pp. 71–6.

¹¹ [Jean Bodin], *Recueil de tout ce qui s'est négocié en la compagnie du tiers Estat de France, en l'assemblée generale des trois Estats, assignez par le Roy en la ville de Bloys, au xv. Novembre 1576* (s.l., 1577), 59[recte 65].

¹² Bodin, *De republica* (1586), sig. ā3. The prefatory letter is dated 29 November 1584; Anjou had died on 19 June of that year. Bodin explicitly linked his new-found leisure to Anjou's death: *De republica* (1586), sig. ā2vo.

¹³ McRae, ed., *Commonweale*, A29.

¹⁴ McRae, ed., *Commonweale*, A33.

For Bodin, a latter-day Cassandra, Anjou's failure was a vindication from which he took no pleasure. In the *République* he had warned of the evils that befell unprotected princes in foreign lands. Eight years later, he inserted and returned to

personal examples, to wounds recently inflicted, which open on the lightest touch and cannot be discussed without the bitterest tears. François, Duke of Anjou, having been summoned, arrived to take upon him the government of the Low Countries and was received with the greatest rejoicing; but as he had no garrisons, no castles, no towns, nor had he been able through my entreaties (I had foreseen what would happen) to bring this about, utter disaster followed, which I cannot remember without pain.¹⁵

Bodin's reception of the Dutch Revolt warrants further analysis not only on account of his personal experiences, but also in the light of the criticism which Bodin's reception or treatment of foreign political systems has received ever since the *République* first appeared. Famously, the 1577 pirated Geneva edition emended the work to (among other things) reflect more accurately the city's form of governance.¹⁶ Bodin's acknowledged source for much of his Scandinavian information, the French ambassador to Denmark, Charles de Danzay, told a correspondent that there was no need to list Bodin's mistakes, "for [Bodin] never even named a Danish, Swedish or any other northern place without falsehood".¹⁷ In the face of traditional praise for mixed constitutions, notably of course Rome's, Bodin needed to apply a certain amount of ingenuity to adjust (foreign) political

¹⁵ Cf. Bodin, *République* (1576), 724–25, and Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 743: "Sed ad domestica redeo, & ad ea vulnera quae recenter illata levissimo tactu recrudescunt, nec sine acerbissimo gemitu tractantur. Franciscus dux Andium ad Belgarum scepra moderanda accersitus venit, & maximis gratulationibus acceptus est: sed cum nulla praesidia, nullas arces, nullas urbes haberet, nec meis rogationibus (qui futura prospexeram) id effici potuisset, ingens secuta clades est, quam sine dolore meminisse non possum". As a critical edition, taking into account both Latin and French versions of the *République*, is still only a work in progress, I have relied for comparisons of this sort on Kenneth McRae's annotated edition of the Knolles translation.

¹⁶ Corinne Müller, "L'édition subreptice des *Six Livres de la République* de Jean Bodin [Genève, 1577]: sa genèse et son influence", *Quaerendo* 10: 3 (1980): 211–36, especially 217–20.

¹⁷ Jacques Bongars to Conrad Rittershusius, 4 April 1600, in Roger Chauviré, *Jean Bodin: auteur de la "République"* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1914), 535–36 (Letter 7): "(Comme Bongars vouloit noter ces passages...) dicebat Dancaeus excriptione non opus esse, nam ne nominari quidem unquam Daniam aut Sueciam aut alium Septentrionis illius locum sine mendacio". See also Danzay's denunciation of Bodin's inaccuracies to the historian Nicolas Krag: Alfred Richard, "Un diplomate poitevin du XVI^e siècle: Charles de Danzay, ambassadeur de France en Danemark", *Mémoires de la société des antiquaires de l'ouest*, 3rd series, 3 (1909), 1–240, here 206.

realities to his novel concept of indivisible sovereignty—a concept, fundamental to his thinking, which a leading, modern political scientist has pronounced, “of course, mistaken”.¹⁸ In many respects Bodin himself may be deemed an exponent of the practices of “misreception” or reception “according to the manner of the receiver”.¹⁹ All in all, his engagement with, and his *changing* analysis of, the Low Countries and its political system make this a particularly apt case study.

This chapter falls into two parts. I will first argue that Bodin’s perception of the government of the Low Countries changed from that of monarchy by way of an anomalous, partially popular form of government, to that of a popular government; and that this view was retroactive, vindicating earlier misgivings. Changes from the French to the Latin editions of the *République* and Bodin’s rarely consulted personal correspondence allow us to document his changing views with relative ease. Bodin’s personal involvement as one of Anjou’s councillors makes this more than a matter simply of reception, however. Successful attempts have been made to account for seeming incongruities between his political actions and his political thought. Bodin’s opposition to the Crown at the Estates-General of 1576,²⁰ and his support for the Catholic *Ligue* in the late 1580s can be elucidated, if only in part, by reference to views which he had published at the time.²¹ In the case of his actions at the Estates, Bodin insisted that

¹⁸ Julian H. Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics”, in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700*, eds. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 298–328, here 303.

¹⁹ Cf. above, p. 35.

²⁰ Bodin’s opposition to the alienation of crown lands at the 1576 assembly has been explained in terms of the long-term interests of the crown and the fundamental laws of the kingdom: see Roland Crahay, “Jean Bodin aux États Généraux de 1576”, *Assemblée di stati e istituzioni rappresentative nella storia del pensiero politico modern (secoli XV–XX)* 1 (1982): 85–120. For a summary of events, see Owen Ulph, “Jean Bodin and the Estates-General of 1576”, *The Journal of Modern History* 19: 4 (1947): 289–96; and for the Crown’s aims (the resumption of war), see Mark Greengrass, “A Day in the Life of the Third Estate: Blois, 26th December 1576”, in *Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honour of J. H. M. Salmon*, ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1994), 73–90.

²¹ The episode is in many ways more perplexing, especially for scholars who see Bodin as a defender of tolerance. For example, Gerrit Voogt, “Politique and Spiritualist Tolerance: Bodin’s *Heptaplomeres* and Coornhert’s *Synodus*”, in *Adaptations of Calvinism in Reformation Europe: Essays in Honour of Brian G. Armstrong*, ed. Mack P. Holt (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 127–43, especially 129, represents Bodin’s actions as “a response to pressure, despite the rationalizations Bodin himself gave for his actions”; Paul Lawrence Rose, “The Politique and the Prophet: Bodin and the Catholic League 1589–1594”, *History Journal* 21, no. 4 (1978): 783–808, whose reading of Bodin is altogether more multifaceted, stresses his religious preoccupations over political ones.

“[i]f nevertheless I had then been a royal procurator, I would not have felt differently,” emphasising later how much his principles had personally cost him.²² Nevertheless, in the same apology Bodin also declared that “I have denied that it is proper for a good man or citizen to do violence to a prince, although a tyrant, for any reason; accordingly, [I established] that this should be left to the vengeance of the immortal God and other princes, and I confirmed this not only with divine and human laws and testimonies, but also with necessary, affirmative arguments”.²³ The first part of this chapter, then, seeks to account in Bodinian terms for Bodin’s involvement in the most unBodinian of acts—the substitution of one prince for another.

The second part moves from the reception of the Revolt by Bodin, to the reception of Bodin in the political pamphlets of the time. Bodin’s response to events unfolding in the Netherlands offers a measure *par excellence* by which to assess the different ways in which the Low Countries can be incorporated within a Bodinian framework—especially as Bodin, even in his personal correspondence, set out his views in terms already expressed in the *République*. The second part of this chapter accordingly considers two pamphlets, both published ostensibly at Reims in 1578. They came to different conclusions but, as I will argue, did so according to a Bodinian method. As Bodin’s reflections in his correspondence date to the period 1581–83 we might be accused of projecting back later concerns. However, since we are, at least in the first instance, concerned only with Bodin’s response as a *plausible* framework for further study such concerns should not trouble us unduly: what remains of Bodin’s correspondence gives us an idea as to how Bodin or a follower may have responded to the events unfolding in the Low Countries.

Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen have persuasively argued that the main significance of political pamphlets of both the Dutch Revolt and the French Wars of Religion lay in their development of theories of (the right and duty of) resistance, which impacted on and anticipated later developments in political theory.²⁴ In the context of the Dutch Revolt, the

²² Jean Bodin, *Les Six livres de la république*, 4th edn. (Paris, 1583), sig. ēr: “Si tamen procurator regius tunc fuisset, non aliter sentirem”.

²³ Bodin, *République* (1583), sig. ā8v. “ego boni[]viri, aut boni civis esse negavi suum principem quantumvis tyrannum ulla ratione violare: hanc denique ultionem immortalis Deo aliisque principibus relinquere oportere: idque cum divinis & humanis legibus ac testimoniis, tum etiam rationibus ad assentiendum necessariis confirmavi”.

²⁴ Quentin Skinner, “The Context of the Huguenot Revolution”. in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 2: 239–301;

most prominent of these pamphlets, William of Orange's *Apologie* (1581), cast Philip II of Spain not only as a tyrant to be resisted, but as a slayer of his wife and son to boot.²⁵ By contrast, the two little-read pamphlets considered here frame the Revolt differently, adopting a *longue durée* historical approach and applying ideal types of governance to questions of loyalty and obedience: these are works of political theory in and of themselves. Accordingly, a study of their reception will raise questions of authorship as well.

1. *Bodin in the Netherlands*

We know very little about Bodin's role in the household of Hercule-François, Duke of Anjou and Alençon.²⁶ The date 1571, still widely given

see especially 284–301 on Bodin's reaction to Huguenot theories of resistance, and the reference on 240 on the afterlife of these theories in the Low Countries and England. Van Gelderen, *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, 62–165.

²⁵ [Loyseleur de Villiers,] *The Apologie or Defence of the Most Noble Prince William, by the Grace of God, Prince of Orange* (Delft, 1581), sig. E2v and H2, where the “incestuous” Philip is (twice) described as a “slaier of his Sonne” Don Carlos and “murtherer of his wife” Elizabeth of Valois; see also, for instance, Gregoire Philereine [pseud.], *Brief Discourse on the Peace Negotiations Now Taking Place at Cologne* (Leiden, 1579) in *The Dutch Revolt*, ed. Martin van Gelderen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 123–64, especially the reference on 128 regarding the “infinite number of his subjects” whom Philip had “masacred and burnt alive.” The *Discours sommier*, the pamphlet issued by the States General in 1577 and discussed below, although carefully avoiding direct criticisms of Philip, is similarly a stinging indictment of evil Spaniards and the “espaignolisez”. The threat of “la totale ruyne & extermination d'eux [the Netherlanders], & leur posterité” leading to “les remedes tels que nature enseigne & les droicts divins & humains permettent” make it a perfect exemplar of the genre. [Philip Marnix], *Discours sommier des justes causes et raisons qui ont contrainct les estats generaulx des Païs bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice*, 2nd edn. (Antwerp, 1577), 2–3 [Knuttel no. 309; on the Knuttel collection see n. 72 below].

²⁶ The evidence presented here draws together all the material on Bodin's stay, collated by Marie-Dominique Couzinet, ed., *Bibliographie des écrivains français: Jean Bodin* (Paris: Memini, 2001). I am not aware of any new source material, but I have re-examined most of the primary source material and rejected one text as being not by Bodin. This text, the “Copie d'une lettre d'un françois escripte a ung sien amy en Angleterre” was printed by Summerfield Baldwin, “Jean Bodin and the League”, *The Catholic Historical Review* 23: 2 (1937): 160–84, here 169–70. Baldwin could not find the title given in the catalogue—“Copie d'Articles de Missives par Bodin envoyees en Angleterre apres la fault de Duc d'Anjou a Anvers”—that led him to MS 2764, Sloane papers, British Library, fo. 19. This second title is, in fact, given on fo. 20 (a continuation of the verso side of fo. 19) but lacks an accompanying text. Given that the page was originally folded, the reference may have been to a text on a different folio. The presence of a separate heading for the text Baldwin transcribed as well as the presence of other texts on the folio page do not inspire confidence. The anti-French tone of the letter surprised Baldwin, and one line in particular

for his entry into the service of Alençon (as he then was) is almost certainly wrong.²⁷ Bodin entered the Duke's service at some point after 1576 and certainly before December 1580.²⁸ His position is invariably described, also by Bodin himself, as "*conseiller et maître de ses [the Duke's] Requestes*" but the only form of payment to survive is an—unfulfilled—promise of a judicial post in one of the ducal domains.²⁹ No mention of Bodin is traceable among the extensive surviving household records and, as a result, the Angevin has become an almost spectre-like figure in the secondary literature. Bodin looms large in accounts of the 1580 negotiations between the States-General and Anjou. At Plessis-lès-Tours, the inclusion of the word "sovereign" in Anjou's title for his projected role in the Low Countries had been a sticking point; yet Bodin was not in fact one of the Duke's

(“Là [at Antwerp] s'est cognu qu'il est dangereux a ung Prince de se fier de jeunes gens, qui n'ont jamais veu le gouvernement des republicques”) seems more apt if the prince in question was the Prince of Orange and the inexperienced “jeunes gens” a reference to Anjou, who died at the age of 29.

²⁷ The date 1571 can be found virtually everywhere: for example, McRae, ed., *Commonweale*, A8; Blair, *Theater*, 10. It is still implicit in Mario Turchetti, “Jean Bodin,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford University, 1997–) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodin/>. It has been dismissed by Marie-Dominique Couzinet, “Note biographique sur Jean Bodin,” in *Jean Bodin: Nature, histoire, droit et politique*, ed. Yves Charles Zarka (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), 233–44, here 240, and Jacqueline Boucher, “L'Incarcération de Jean Bodin pendant la troisième guerre de religion,” *Nouvelle revue du seizième siècle* 1 (1983): 33–44, here 42. I trace the date back first to Chauviré, *Jean Bodin*, 35, who “je m'en remets entièrement à” Pierre Bayle on this point. Bayle mistook a marginal reference in the *République*: cf. Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Amsterdam, 1740), 1:589 with Bayle's source, Jean Bodin, *De republica libri sex* (Oberursel, 1601), 255. The marginal date (1571) there belongs to the event described, the debate on Alençon's powers within his duchy, rather than to Bodin's appointment. This debate is already described as having taken place in 1571 in the French version of the *République*, without reference to that alleged appointment. Bodin, *République* (1576), 207.

²⁸ The first surviving reference to Bodin as “maître des Requestes de Monseigneur” is a letter dated 3 December 1580. A. Ponthieux, “Quelques Documents inédites sur Jean Bodin,” *Revue du seizième siècle* 15 (1928): 56–99, here 76. There are three reasons to think the year 1576 important. Firstly, there is no mention of his position in Anjou's household in the 1576 *République* when there so easily could have been (see the note above). Secondly, alienation from the crown (such as Bodin experienced after the Estates-General of 1576) had also driven others into Anjou's service (for instance, Guillaume de Hautemer, sieur de Fervacques; Frédéric Duquenne, *L'Entreprise du duc d'Anjou aux Pays-Bas de 1580 à 1584* (Villeneuve-d-Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), 30). Finally, Bodin's marriage with Françoise Trouillart on 25 February 1576 brought him into a family with a history of service to Anjou: see Boucher, “L'Incarcération”, 42.

²⁹ See the *brevet* dated 10 August 1583 published in Ponthieux, “Quelques documents,” 63. In the *Republica*, Bodin describes himself in identical terms as “libellorum magistrum & consilii participem”: Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 163.

negotiators.³⁰ Anjou's attempt to seize power at Antwerp—the “utter disaster” that Bodin witnessed—is often seen within the framework set out in the *République*.³¹ There, Bodin had observed that when a wolf is allowed to guard the sheep, protection often changes into *seigneurie*.³² Protectors did this by right, if those protected broke their word.³³ But Bodin's persistent refusal even to acknowledge Anjou's involvement makes it unlikely that he counselled the Duke to put theory into practice. It is difficult therefore to discern Bodin's hand or theory in events. Indeed, “sovereignty”, the term that Bodin claimed no one before him had defined, was employed by the Anjou household before Plessis-lès-Tours.³⁴ Already, in December 1578, as Anjou's first foray in the Low Countries faltered, his envoy, the Sieur des Pruneaux, had proposed that the Dutch States-General invest Anjou with the Duchy of Luxembourg and the County of Burgundy “*en pleine souveraineté*” to form a protective shield, separating the remainder of the Low Countries from Spain.³⁵

In contrast, the converse—discernment of the reception of events by Bodin himself—is relatively straightforward. Patriotism appears the main obstacle to determining where, in 1576, sovereignty in the Low Countries lay for Bodin. Sovereignty of the Low Countries is discussed in *République* I.x: “Of a Tributary or Feudatory Prince”—a chapter which showcased “the grandeur and sovereignty of the house of France”.³⁶ Bodin not only frees France from papal suzerainty but strongly implies that the popes, in some of their Italian possessions, were French vassals.³⁷ The French crown historically possessed the imperial crown and the power to elect popes.³⁸

³⁰ Van Gelderen, *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, 180; Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, 135; Gordon Griffiths, “Humanists and Representative Government in the Sixteenth Century: Bodin, Marnix, and the Invitation to the Duke of Anjou to become Ruler of the Low Countries”, *Representative Institutions in Theory and Practice* (Brussels: Les éditions de la librairie encyclopédique, 1970), 59–83, who speculates that Bodin's absence was intentional and allowed him to wash his hands of events afterwards.

³¹ Duquenne, *L'Entreprise*, 145–46; the only mention of Bodin in Duquenne's account.

³² Bodin, *République* (1576), 92.

³³ Bodin, *République* (1576), 88.

³⁴ Bodin, *République* (1576), 125.

³⁵ “Mémoire de des Pruneaux sur les moyens de contenter le duc d'Anjou”, in *Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas (1576–1583)*, eds. P. L. Muller and Alphonse Diegerick, vol. 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1890), 361–62 (Document 297), here 362.

³⁶ Bodin, *République* (1576), 184: “Voilà quant à la grandeur & souveraineté de la maison de France”.

³⁷ Bodin, *République* (1576), 182–84.

³⁸ Bodin, *République* (1576), 180.

Amid this historical grandstanding, Bodin seems particularly keen to strip Emperor Charles V of all sovereignty over his vast dominions, and to the benefit of France; by Bodin's account, even the crown of Castile "had fallen (*estoit escheu*)" by descent in the female line to Louis IX.³⁹ It was equally clear that "all that the Emperor had in the Low Countries, he held by necessity from the crown of France or from the Empire".⁴⁰

Nevertheless, this grandstanding was historical, and Bodin implies that French claims on the Low Countries had since lapsed, for he adds that "*even now (mesme encore)* [my emphasis], the county of Charolais [part of Franche-Comté] is held from the King of Spain *en propriété* and from the Crown of France *en souveraineté*".⁴¹ The Netherlands highlighted the difficult position of feudatory princes within Bodinian political thought, in which either a prince had no overlords or he was no prince. At the same time, the jurist recognizes the tenurial complexities that continued to arise from the intricacies of feudal law. The distinction which Bodin observes in this regard, between non-native vassals (who could renege on their service) and subject-vassals (who could not), rendered the position of Charles V problematic; the Emperor had been born in Ghent when Flanders was still, at least notionally, a fief of the French crown and he owed, in Bodin's view, his allegiance to the French crown. Yet, by 1576 the Low Countries, under the rule of Charles's son, could hardly be considered a fief of the French crown, and Bodin denounced those who claimed that Philip II did not hold full sovereignty over Aragon and Milan, other possessions with powerful estates.⁴² For Bodin, the battle of Pavia of 1525 rectified this difficulty for it liberated Charles from French overlordship. As such, it is seminal in Bodin's thinking about the sovereignty of the Low Countries. After Pavia, Charles had kept Francis I prisoner and "would never consent to his release until [the King] had entirely given up the sovereignty of the Low Countries".⁴³ It is not entirely clear that within Bodin's theory the French sovereign possessed this power. Bodin in his discussion

³⁹ Bodin, *République* (1576), 167.

⁴⁰ Bodin, *République* (1576), 166–67: "tout ce qu'avoit l'Empereur au bas païs, estoit tenu de la couronne de France, ou de l'Empire par necessité".

⁴¹ Bodin, *République* (1576), 167: "Et mesmes encore le Comté de Charolois, est tenu en propriété du Roy d'Espagne, & en souveraineté de la couronne de France".

⁴² Bodin, *République* (1576), 128, 130–31. How Bodin dealt (or rather did not deal) with supposedly "composite" monarchies is noteworthy: see his comments on Philip's undisputed sovereignty over Milan, despite the existence of a senate (128), and Aragon, despite their Estates (130–31).

⁴³ Bodin, *République* (1576), 162. "ne voulut oncques consentir sa delivrance, qu'il n'eust entierement quitté la souveraineté du bas pays".

of the Treaty of Madrid, which effected King Francis's release, appears to want to have it both ways, but the Treaty was therefore by implication still partially valid.⁴⁴ All references in the *République* to Charles V's being a vassal of France predate Pavia.⁴⁵

The possibility of *popular* sovereignty does not enter into Bodin's discussion within the context of past French claims to the Low Countries, but it is briefly touched upon elsewhere. Bodin is well aware that the people of Ghent, in particular, had frequently rebelled. The subject interested the jurist; as we saw, he later discussed the rebellion with the town's inhabitants. Yet, the Emperor had rectified this difficulty as well by taking his vengeance on "the thousand seditions and rebellions that they habitually perpetrated of old and that had until then remained unpunished by the sufferance or weakness of the Counts of Flanders"—a situation Bodin also blames on a lack of (settler) colonies accompanying the garrisons.⁴⁶ It appears that with Charles's assumption of sovereignty and punishment of past rebellions, the situation had again righted itself: Charles and Philip are more than mere counts.⁴⁷ It is significant in that regard that Bodin, when discussing the special significance of 27 September 1567 and the "*conionction des trois hautes planettes*" in relation to tumultuous events

⁴⁴ Bodin, *République* (1576), 102–3, 619; Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 595. Bodin's treatment of the Madrid Treaty was suitably complicated and, or so it seems to me, purposely obscure. He strenuously objected to the argument that Francis, being forced by imprisonment, could renege on the agreement after his release; in the Latin version he wondered why the President of the Paris *Parlement* was not embarrassed to "eius tam ineptis argumentis se munire": *De republica* (1586), 595. Yet, Bodin also felt, unsurprisingly, that part of the royal domain could not be alienated without agreement from the Estates; "Quant à ce point il est bien certain: que c'estoit assez, pour rompre le traicté": *République* (1576), 103. Bodin's conclusion seems to have been that Francis should never have been asked to ratify the treaty in the first place. "Mais toutes ces questions ne furent oncques revoquees en doubte par les anciens. iamais on ne demanda que le prince lasché hors les mains des ennemis, ratifiast ce qu'il avoit iuré estant prisonnier, chose qui est ridicule, car c'est revouer en doubte, le traicté, & mettre au plaisir de celuy qui estoit prisonnier, s'il doit garder ce qu'il a iuré, ou non": *République* (1576), 103.

⁴⁵ Jean Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 151; Jean Bodin, *De la démonomanie des sorciers* (Paris: Du Puy, 1582), fo. 41v. References to the Battle of Pavia can be found in Bodin's other writings as well, suggesting that the battle pre-occupied him more generally. Bodin mentions the battle when discussing planetary conjunctions in his *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, and a person consulting a witch to divine the battle's outcome in the *Démonomanie*.

⁴⁶ Bodin, *République* (1576), 395: "la vengeance qu'il print de mil seditions, & rebellions qu'ils avoyent accoustumé de faire de toute ancienneté & que estoient iusques alors demeurees impunies par la souffrance, ou impuissance des Contes de Flandre".

⁴⁷ See Bodin's discussion of the *marques* of sovereignty, especially in *République* (1576), 191–92, and his attitude towards "composite" monarchies discussed in n. 42 above.

across Europe, sees “the Flemings [rebell] against *the Catholic king*”.⁴⁸ This is the only reference to events unfolding the Netherlands in the decade preceding the *République*. It had been the dire situation in France that had compelled Bodin to write. None of the events prior to 1576 inspired him to think of the Low Countries, at least since 1525, as anything other than part of a monarchical state.

As we have already seen, the situation in the Low Countries changed rapidly in the months after the appearance of the *République*, and calls for Anjou’s intervention grew louder after every rebel defeat. The first evidence of Bodin’s objections to Anjou’s involvement in the Low Countries dates from his time in England. It was against the backdrop of the doomed Anglo-French marriage negotiations of the winter of 1581–82 that the Duke’s assistance to the Dutch rebels became again a matter of urgency. In his account of Anjou’s embassy to England, the Duke of Nevers wrote that Bodin opposed the courtship of the Dutch envoys, complaining of “the inconstancy (*legereté*) of the Flemings, the small means they have of relieving His Highness and assisting him with money and other necessities for this war”.⁴⁹ In a letter to Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth’s principal secretary, with whom Bodin appears to have been friendly, the Angevin sets out his objections in very similar terms. Sent after less than a month in the Low Countries, the letter provides further evidence of Bodin’s claim to have foretold the disaster:

That is why I told [the Duke of Anjou] in England that no conquering prince, elected and called in by the subjects of another, had ever gone save with a good powerful army, for there is no doubt but that the enemy will soon besiege the towns, and that they, being masters of the countryside (*maïstres de la campagne*), will devastate the open country, to stir up the subjects to rebellion against the new lord, before they have given him allegiance.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Bodin, *République* (1576), 441: “les Flamens contre le roy Catholique” (emphasis added).

⁴⁹ Duke of Nevers, “Voyage de Feu Monsieur le Duc d’Anjou en Angleterre”, *Les Mémoires de M. le duc de Nevers, prince de Mantoue* (Paris, 1665), 551–60, here 558: “se deffiant, comme il disoit, de la legereté des Flamans, & du peu de moyen qu’ils avoient de secourir S[on] A[lt]èse & luy assister d’argent & autres choses necessaires à cette guerre”. The document is dated 3 March 1582; Anjou’s party had arrived at Flushing on 10 February.

⁵⁰ Jean Bodin to Walsingham, 5 March 1582, State Papers 83/15 fol. 43, National Archives: “c[’]est pourqoy je luy die en Angleterre que jamais prince conquerant eleu ou appellé par les sugets d[’]autrui n[’]estoit allé sinon avec une bonne et puissante armee[.] car il n[’]y a doute que les ennemis n[’]assiegent rien tost les villes et qu[’]ilz ne gastent le plat pay[.] estant maïstres de la campagne[.] pour esmouvoir les sugets à rebellion contre le nouveau seigneur au paravant qui luy ayant presté obeissance”. The original document has been consulted electronically through Gale’s *State Papers Online 1509–1714* database. The

The enemy here—"a powerful foe"—are, clearly, the Spanish forces of Alexander Farnese, the then governor-general.⁵¹ The passage echoes the concerns originally reported by Nevers. Bodin was, indeed, concerned about the loyalty of Anjou's new subjects and worried about the lack of military resources to overcome such difficulties—echoing and, as we saw later adding to, a point made in the *République*.⁵² Bodin had emphasized the importance of forts and garrisons for princes and protectors establishing themselves in formerly popular states.⁵³

Vindication would come nine months later, when on 17 January 1583 Anjou's troops launched an attack on Antwerp. This event, the French Fury, brought back memories of the Spanish Fury of 1576 when unpaid Spanish soldiers had sacked the metropole. In the words of one modern historian, that had been a "holocaust"; but, at least for the Spanish soldiers, the sack of Antwerp had been a victory to be described in providential terms.⁵⁴ By contrast, the French Fury was an unmitigated disaster for the troops involved. Bodin in his letter to his friend and brother-in-law Nicolas Trouillart recounted that the French, shouting *Vive la messe*, had believed that they would have the support of the Catholic part of the town's citizenry, but no such support materialised.⁵⁵ By Bodin's account, the whole affair left 1,600 soldiers, including 200 gentlemen, dead—about half the total invasion force.⁵⁶ When in the *Republica* he observes that "the Netherlanders (*Belgae*) have been accustomed to cut the throat of

translation has been adapted from "Elizabeth: March 1582, 1–5," *Calendar of State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth*, Vol. 15: 1581–1582 (1907), 510–34, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk>.

⁵¹ Bodin to Walsingham, State Papers 83/15 fol. 43: "ung puissant ennemy".

⁵² Bodin, *République* (1576), 724–25 (cf. n. 15 above).

⁵³ Bodin, *République* (1576), 413 (on the need for a new prince to use force); 419 (the happy example of Medici Florence); and 410 (Augustan Rome). See also Bodin, *République* (1576), 92, where Bodin observes that Geneva would have lost its independence to its Bernese protectors, if the latter had possessed a garrison in the city.

⁵⁴ Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 178; on the contemporary Spanish perspective, see Balthasar Lopez de la Cueva to Secretary Cayas, 7 November 1576, in Louis Prosper Gachard, ed., *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, 6 vols. (Brussels: Muquardt, 1848–1936), 5 (1879): 16–17 (letter 1773).

⁵⁵ Jean Bodin to Nicolas Trouillart, 23 January 1583. The letter, in the Dupuy collection of the Bibliothèque nationale de France, has twice been independently published: Jean Bodin, "Tumulte d'Anuers escrit par I. Bodin", in Chauviré, *Jean Bodin*, 524–29 (Appendix 2); and Louis Prosper Gachard, ed., "Lettre de Jean Bodin sur l'entreprise du duc d'Anjou contre la ville d'Anvers", *Compte rendu des séances de la Commission Royale d'histoire ou recueil de ses bulletins*, 2nd series, 12 (1859): 458–63 (Document 130). There are lacunae in both versions. I have collated the two different readings but have been unable to see the original manuscript. Page references are to Chauviré, referenced "Tumulte"; here, 525.

⁵⁶ Bodin, "Tumulte", 527. The figure suggested by Parker is 2,000 deaths out an invasion force of 3,500; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 206.

noblemen with a sword as if they were cattle”, he was speaking as an eye-witness.⁵⁷ In his letter to Trouillart, Bodin praises God: “it is the thirteenth time that I have been close to death without dying”.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, for the second time in his life he found himself imprisoned, possibly again for his own protection.⁵⁹ It is in his letter to Trouillart that we first find Bodin’s more theoretical objections.

I have foreseen and foretold this misfortune to [Philip Marnix of] Sainte Aldegonde and Des Pruneaux in England when I told them that their negotiations would lead to the ruin of our Prince and of the Low Countries, recognising the difference in customs and humours of the two peoples, the difference in religion and the possession of liberty which they [the Netherlanders] would never give up, having possessed citadels in order to be masters of the prince. Because it is very certain that he is master of the state who is master of force, and tenders obedience only as he pleases, so that sovereignty, which never suffers division, would be found shared by a prince and his subjects, which would cause the ruin of a state. It would be better to leave it in complete freedom than to cut it in half. Even the prince who is among a subdued people cannot do harm when there is in addition no or little nobility in the country and they have no voice nor any credit in the estates. Nevertheless, they are the principal liaison between the prince and the people in every monarchy.⁶⁰

We cannot know whether Bodin’s premonitions and practical objections, stated prior to the event, crystallised into theoretical objections or were their expression from the start. Bodin’s invocation of the difference in customs is easily enough understood, but his other comments are not so plainly warranted. That the people possessed “force” is evident in the

⁵⁷ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 761: “Belgae nobilium iugulum gladio pecudum in morem haurire consueverunt”. The addition breaks up the natural flow of the argument.

⁵⁸ Bodin, “Tumulte,” 529: “Et pour mon particulier i[']ay bien louer Dieu qui m[']a sauvé la vie car cest la treizieme fois que i[']ay esté pres ung point de la mort sans mourir”.

⁵⁹ See Boucher, “L’Incarcération”, 33.

⁶⁰ Bodin, “Tumulte”, 528: “I[']ay preveu et predict ce malheur en Angleterre a Monsieur de Sainte Aldegonde & des Pruneaux lorsque ie leur dis que leurs negociations tiroient après soy la ruïne de nostre prince et du bas païs congnoissant la contrariété des meurs et humeurs des deux peuples & la difference de religion et la possession de liberté laquelle iamais ilz ne voudroient quitter[.] ayans eu les citadelles pour estre maistres du prince: car il est bien certain que celuy est maistre de l’estat qui est maistre de la force [Gachard inserts “publique” here] et ne preste obeissance que ce qu[']il luy plaist en sorte que la souveraineté ne souffrant iamais division se trouveroit partie entre le prince et les sujetz qui causeroit la ruïne d[']un estat et vault mieux le laisser en pleine liberté que le trancher par moytié et mesme le prince estant au meilleu du peuple forcé ne peut nuyre ioinct aussy qu[']il n y a plus ou fort peu de noblesse au païs et n[']ont voix ne credit aucun aux estatz. Neantmoins c[']est la principale liaison entre le prince & le peuple en toute monarchie”. A, not unproblematic, English translation is given in Griffiths, “Humanists,” 77–78.

French casualty toll, but Bodin was also speaking in more abstract terms, echoing but also modifying the theory he had publicly expressed.

According to the *République*, “in matters of state, who is master of force is master of men and of laws and the whole Commonwealth.”⁶¹ The ability to give law to subjects was “the first mark of sovereignty,” and Bodin insisted that a prince could not share it with the people or the state would be a popular one. To Bodin’s mind, popular government was inimical to any form of virtue, but in 1576 a state, which granted authority to a princely magistrate, could, however unstable, still exist.⁶² In the *Republica*, this form of shared governance is instead described as “not a Commonwealth but an Anarchy, worse than the cruellest tyranny.”⁶³ At Antwerp, Bodin had learned that a master of force “only tenders obedience as he pleases,” and that anarchy, not government, logically ensued if the master of force were not also sovereign.

Bodin is more muted in the *République* with regard to the second point made in the passage above, the role of the nobility. In 1576, Bodin had occupied himself rather with the danger of divisions within the nobility for aristocratic forms of government.⁶⁴ The Angevin may well have come to appreciate their importance more having noted their absence in the Low Countries; in 1576, he had claimed that the loss of the nobility would only lead to the fall of a monarchy if it was accompanied by the death of the princes of the blood.⁶⁵ As the Low Countries lacked both nobility and a prince, there seems little doubt that Bodin felt the popular to be their current, and preferred, state: “It would be better to leave it in complete freedom than to cut it in half”. The reference to the Low Countries historically “having possessed (*ayans eu*) citadels in order to be masters of the prince” implies that this form of government had in effect reverted to an earlier original, popular condition of the country—evoking the weakness

⁶¹ Bodin, *République* (1576), 231: “en matiere d'estat, qui est maistre de la force, il est maistre des hommes, & des loix, & de toute la Republique”. The comment is repeated on 414, where it is called a “maxime indubitable”.

⁶² For Bodin’s criticism of the popular state, see Bodin, *République* (1576), 676–79.

⁶³ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 176: “Anarchia non Respublica fuerit, tyrannide crudelissima deterior.” Translation adapted from McRae, ed., *Commonweale*, A117. Cf. Bodin’s original comment, *République* (1576), 220: “la premiere marque de souveraineté, est donner la loy aux sugets: & qui seront les sugets qui obeiront, s’ils ont aussi puissance de faire loy? . . . ainsi faut il conclure par necessité, que si pas un en particulier n’a puissance de faire la loy, ains que ce pouvoir soit à tous ensemble, que la Republique est populaire”.

⁶⁴ Bodin, *République* (1576), 422–23.

⁶⁵ Bodin, *République* (1576), 422.

of the counts of Flanders which Bodin had discussed in the *République* and Charles V had avenged.

Even a partial revelation of Bodin's theoretical objections already brought trouble. "Knowing these indubitable maxims in terms of state and having declared them *in part*", Bodin recalls, "I have been hated and the sieur de Fervacques even called me a Spaniard, when we were in England".⁶⁶ In a letter to Walsingham written a few weeks later, Bodin despaired of Anjou's recalcitrant behaviour since the "French Fury", but still refused to believe Anjou would have sullied "the splendour and all the lustre of his exploits" in such a way.⁶⁷ In that letter, Bodin again emphasizes the structural causes of the troubles, "which find their origin much further back than many people think"—possibly, a reference to the powerless counts of Flanders.⁶⁸

In the *République*, the sovereignty of the Low Countries had only been considered as part of a discussion of French overlordship. The Trouillart letter shows that at least by this time Bodin had come to regard the Netherlands as—quite likely retroactively—a popular state. In the wake of the French Fury, he saw Anjou's rule over the Low Countries as an anomaly, an impossible attempt to share sovereignty. But Bodin's practical concern about the need for arms, which he certainly expressed before January 1583, also readily reflects awareness of a precondition for a successful change from a popular to monarchical form of sovereignty. It is with Anjou's experiences in mind that Bodin must have added to the *Republica* that

the supreme power of a prince cannot be subjected to, circumscribed by, or in any part of it shared with meetings of the nobility or the people without harm. Otherwise, the sovereignty necessarily falls either into destructive anarchy or into popular disorder. This must also be considered by us very carefully, so that we do not listen to the seditious voices of the people and the ignorant, who believe that princes should be subjected to the councils and estates of the people, and from them receive laws of command and restraint, in which case the ruin not only of the most illustrious monarchies, but also of the subjects necessarily follows.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Bodin, "Tumulte," 528–29: "Sçachant ces maximes indubitables en termes des[tat; the suggestion is Chauviré's] et les ayant en partie declarées i[']en ay esté mal voulu & mesmes le sieur de Fervacques m[']en a appellé Espagnol estant en Angleterre".

⁶⁷ Letter from Bodin to Walsingham, 30 January / 9 February 1583: State Papers 83/18, fo. 42, National Archives: "la splendeur et tout le lustre de ses beaux faitz". Retrieved from State Papers Online, Gale (cited above, note 50).

⁶⁸ State Papers 83/18, fo. 42: "qui prend son origine de bien plus loin que plusieurs n['] estiment".

⁶⁹ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 712: "At summa principis potestas optimatium populivae coetibus nec subiugari, nec circu[m]cidi, nec ulla sui parte communicari sine pernicie

Bodin may have remembered the treaty of Plessis-Lès-Tours, where the States-General denied Anjou sovereignty over the Low Countries. Certainly, the reciprocal ruin of monarch and subjects recalls Bodin's prediction to Marnix and Des Pruneaux in England.

In the *Republica*, the Dutch Revolt is no longer ignored as it had been in 1576; it has become an event that can be accounted for, and by virtue of being accountable within the Bodinian framework it is implicitly legitimated. Bodin now invokes two surprisingly plain, long-term reasons to explain the Dutch Revolt: excessive taxation under the Duke of Alva and the execution of heretics—both practices against which he had warned princes in the *République*.⁷⁰ But Bodin also invokes a difference in climate. Apparently, the Netherlanders were as incompatible with the Spanish as they were with the French:

[T]he most important reason why the people of the Netherlands revolted against Spanish rule was that they could not stand Spanish ways, which are most unlike their own. But the Spanish sky is separated by almost twelve degrees of latitude from the most distant stretches of the Low Countries, and this is the most important source of the differences in character.⁷¹

2. *Setting out the Case for Anjou: The Lettre contenant un avis (1578)*

From the spring of 1578 onwards, pamphlets advocated the appointment of Anjou as protector of the Low Countries.⁷² If a meaningful connection between these texts and Anjou could be substantiated, it would make the identification of Bodinian aspects more credible. Certainly, Anjou had adherents of many different stripes in the Low Countries. As early as May

potest, alioqui maiestatem Imperii vel in pestiferam anarchiam, vel in popularem perturbationem prolabi necesse est. Id autem attentius ponderandum nobis est, ne seditiosas popularium ac imperitorum voces exaudiamus, qui principes populorum coetibus & comitiis subiiciendos, ab iisque imperandi ac prohibendi leges accipiendas esse putant: qua quidem re non modo monarchiarum pulcherrimarum sed etiam subditorum interitus sequatur necesse est". Cf. Bodin, *République* (1576), 694, where the passage is absent.

⁷⁰ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 657, 477.

⁷¹ Bodin, *De republica* (1586), 493: "Quod item Belgae ab Hispanorum imperio defece- runt, hanc potissimum defectionis causam fuisse constat, quod Hispanorum mores suis dissimilimos ferre non possent. abest autem caelum Hispanorum ab extremo Belgarum tractu duodecim fere partibus in latitudinem, a qua morum dissimilitudines praecipue oriuntur". The translation is adapted from: McRae, ed., *Commonweale*, A140.

⁷² Most, but not all, of the pamphlets discussed here are in the recently digitised Knuttel collection of the Royal Library in The Hague and are included in *The Early Modern Pamphlets Online* (Brill), <http://tempo.idcpublishers.info>. I have given the reference to the Knuttel shelfmark, when appropriate.

1576 the rebel Dutch provinces had drafted an agreement, which would have appointed him Count of Holland and Zeeland.⁷³ The contrary idea of involving both Anjou and the French crown on the *royal* side drew support from the Walloon border provinces.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the author of at least one of the pro-Anjou pamphlets was French. Although ostensibly written by “*un gentilhomme*” from Walloon Hainaut, the author referred to Henry III as “*notre Roy*”, spoke of “*nos François*”, even “*nos*” Pyrenees, but “*voz* [as in Netherlandish] *libertez*”—mistakes corrected systematically in at least one copy.⁷⁵ Evidence suggests that the publication of the pro-Anjou pamphlets was coordinated; almost all can be traced back to the same printing press in Antwerp, where Anjou’s agents were pressing his case with the States-General.⁷⁶ This press also printed a “*proposition*” by the French ambassador, offering the King’s intercession and implicit support for his brother’s actions, and, after the first ill-fated treaty was signed, a complaint to the States-General by the Duke’s envoy, Des Pruneaux, that Anjou was not some sort of “*prince vagabond*” who could be refused a home.⁷⁷ These were official pronouncements, and it is relevant here that the treaty between Anjou and the States of 13 August 1578 was reprinted

⁷³ Koenraad Swart, *William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1572–84*, trans. J. C. Grayson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 101.

⁷⁴ Jean Vendeville to the Abbott of Saint-Ghislain, 14 July 1577. Alexis Possoz, *Mgr Jean Vendeville évêque de Tournai, 1587–1592* (Lille: L. Lefort, 1862), 182–85 (Appendix F), esp. 184–85. On Vendeville, see Violet Soen, “The Loyal Opposition of Jean Vendeville (1527–1592): Contributions to a Contextualized Biography,” in *The Quintessence of Lives: Intellectual Biographies in the Low Countries Presented to Jan Roegiers*, eds. Dries Vanysacker et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 43–61.

⁷⁵ *Lettre d’un gentilhomme de Haynault, a Monsieur de la Mothe, Gouverneur de Gravelines* (s.l., 1578), 37, 58, 59, 68 [Knuttel no. 390]. The copy in question is RES 550059 (4) in the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris.

⁷⁶ The printer in question is the little-known Antwerp printer, Christiaen Houweel, who also printed, indirectly, on behalf of the Dutch States-General: Paul Valkema Blouw, “Willem Silvius, Christiaen Houweel and anti-Spanish propaganda, 1577 to 1579,” *Quaerendo* 24: 1 (1994): 3–29; see Valkema Blouw’s suggestion (p. 27) that the pro-Anjou pamphlets were a French commission. The only pro-Anjou pamphlet not printed by Houweel is the Hainaut letter mentioned above. Valentin de Pardieu, seigneur de la Motte, to whom this letter was ostensibly addressed, defected to Don Juan on 8 April 1578: I. L. A. Diegerick, ed., *Correspondance de Valentine de Pardieu, Seigneur de la Motte* (Bruges: Vandeensteeler-Werbrouck, 1857), 22–23. It is possible that this pamphlet was written first.

⁷⁷ Valkema Blouw, “Willem Silvius”, 11, 17; *La Proposition de Monsieur Bellievre Ambassadeur du Roy de France, faite a son Alteze & Messieurs des Estats du Pais Bas le 4. Aoust, 1578* (s.l., 1578) [Knuttel no. 375]; *Lettre escripte par Monseigneur le Duc d’Anjou, à Messieurs les Estats generaux des Pays Bas* (s.l., 1578) [Knuttel no. 388], 17. The comment was made in Des Pruneaux’s much longer “Remonstrance” appended to Anjou’s letter; the nature of Anjou’s complaints is further evidence of the involvement of his entourage.

in Rouen and in Paris.⁷⁸ Anjou's entourage had been adept at publicising his exploits in the arena of the French Civil Wars; their terrain had now been extended to encompass the Low Countries as well.⁷⁹

Two pro-Anjou *lettres*, published by the same press and ostensibly completed within a week of each other around the end of May 1578, had complementary aims.⁸⁰ One *lettre*, as the title indicates, was a justification of Anjou's recent actions, both in the Low Countries and in France, hence suggesting an intended audience beyond the Netherlands.⁸¹ The second *lettre* places the Revolt of the Netherlands in a historical framework and argues that only foreign intervention could protect the Low Countries.⁸² It is the latter that interests us here.

Ostensibly, this pamphlet had been written by a German gentleman, who having lived in France for ten years dared to write in French.⁸³ French authorship is much more likely for a number of reasons. First, the—ostensibly German—author warned the reader that Germans as a general rule could not be trusted, especially with womenfolk. Their presence

⁷⁸ *Accord et alliance faite entre le duc d'Anjou, Alençon, &c. d'une part: & les prelatz, nobles & deputez des villes representants les Estats generaux des pays bas, d'autre part* (Rouen: Thomas Mallard, [1578]). On Mallard, see Georges Lepreux, *Gallia Typographica ou répertoire biographique et chronologique de tous les imprimeurs de France depuis les origines de l'imprimerie jusqu'à la Révolution*, série départementale, 3:1 (Paris: Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1912), 309–10; note the privilege on sig. D3vo, dated 4 October 1578. The title page includes Mallard's address. Another copy "suyvant la copie Imprimee à Rouen, par Thomas Mallard" was printed in Paris by Jean Coquerel in 1579; the presence of Coquerel's address makes pseudonymity unlikely. On Jean Coquerel or Jean Coqueret (d. 1610?), see the brief reference in Jean-Dominique Mellot and Élisabeth Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs / libraires (vers 1500–vers 1810)*, new ed. ([Paris:] Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 2004), 152.

⁷⁹ See the entries in Andrew Pettegree *et al.*, eds., *French Vernacular Books: Books Published in the French Language before 1601*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1:628–29. One of these was translated into English, perhaps with an eye on the English match: *The Protestation of the Most High and Mightie Prince Frauncis, Bothe Sonne and Brother of [the] King [of France], Duke of Allenson and of Eureux, Earle of Droux, & of Perche* (London, 1575). I am not, of course, suggesting that Anjou's entourage was behind the publication of all 43 texts listed, but titles and the total number suggest that some were so conditioned.

⁸⁰ The "Rouen" letter was dated 24 May, the "Reims" letter 1 June 1578.

⁸¹ *Lettre contenant l'esclaircissement des actions et deportemens de Monsieur filz & frere de Roy Duc d'Anjou, d'Alençon, &c: Tant pour le regard des choses qui sont avenues es guerres civiles de la France, comme en ce qui concerne le fait & deffence des Pays Bas contre les Espagnols* (Rouen [=Antwerp], 1578) [Knuttel no. 360].

⁸² *Lettre contenant un avis de l'estat auquel sont les affaires des Pais-Bas, tant pour le regard des principales provinces & villes en particulier, comme de toutes ensemble en general, avecq la recherche du party, le plus prompt & plus asseuré, que les Estats puissent prendre contre l'Espagnol, pour leur conservation & salut* (Reims [=Antwerp], 1578) [Knuttel no. 358/9; hereafter, *Lettre*].

⁸³ *Lettre*, 2.

would “only increase the number of eaters or, better yet, drinkers, and charge you with an expense which surpasses all your other costs”.⁸⁴

Second, there is surprisingly little empathy with the traditional motivations for rebellion.⁸⁵ Philip II is twice called a tyrant, yet in the entire treatise he is not mentioned by name.⁸⁶ Rather than focus on the right to resistance—the aspect that made Huguenot propaganda so important in the history of political thought—the author emphasizes the (almost righteous) anger of the Spanish Crown from which the Netherlands must be shielded. Hanging over the Low Countries is the threat of mass transportation: “They have already designated the places to which they will transport the greatest part of the people, who remain after the civil war; [designated] the towns which must take new [*i.e.* Spanish] inhabitants and [*possibly a reference to Bodin’s discussion of the 1539 Ghent rebellion*] colonies”.⁸⁷ Times may change the fears and passions of the inhabitants little by little, “but not the desire that [the Spaniard] has to avenge himself on you or the suspicion that he will always have, that you wish to do what you have done more than fifty times in three hundred years”—that is, to rebel.⁸⁸ The royal side is also able to attract “the better part of the most intelligent men of the Low Countries, having left amongst the rest of you many very useless or almost ungovernable persons”—a damning judgment on the pamphlet’s supposed readership.⁸⁹

Finally, the pro-French slant can be taken as a further indication of the author’s origin. He emphasizes that “the nature of the Frenchman is much more similar to yours than that of the German”.⁹⁰ Surely, few inhabitants of the Low Countries would face with an equanimity equal to that of the

⁸⁴ See the comments in *Lettre*, 66, 70–71, and 45: “ce n’est qu’augmenter le nombre des mangeurs, ou pour mieus dire des beuveurs, & vous charger d’une despense qui surpasse tous voz autres frais”. That “les hommes de Septentrion” were “grand beuveurs” was also the opinion of Bodin: see Bodin, *République* (1576), 435.

⁸⁵ The denunciation of recent Spanish atrocities takes up just over one (end of page 50 to start of page 52) of 74 pages.

⁸⁶ *Lettre*, 52. Elsewhere, he is called “son [as in, Charles’s] fils” (16), “le Roy d’Espagne” (17), “le Roy Catholique” (40).

⁸⁷ *Lettre*, 52: “on a deia designé les lieux ou l’on doit transporter la plus grande partie du peuple, qui restera de la guerre civile, & les villes ou l’on doit emmener de nouveau habitans & colonies”.

⁸⁸ *Lettre*, 72: “Mais non le desir qu’il a de se venger de vous, ou le soupçon qu’aura touiour, que vous veuillez faire ce que vous avez faict plus de cinquante fois en trois cens ans”.

⁸⁹ *Lettre*, 36: “la meilleure partie des plus habiles hommes du païs bas, & entre le rest vous avoir laissé plusieurs personnes fort inutiles ou malaisees à gouverner”.

⁹⁰ *Lettre*, 50: “le naturel du François est beaucoup plus semblable au vostre, que celuy de l’Allemand”.

author the prospect of their homeland's addition to France, in the event of Anjou's succession to the French throne, "filled with the happiness and comfort that the free commerce and proximity of such a kingdom can bring you".⁹¹

The German cloak was a useful cover, ensuring that the game was not prematurely given away; the author only introduced the idea of appointing a foreign leader some twenty pages in, and advanced the proposal that this should be Anjou even more slowly. The *Lettre*, therefore, was a systematic, "mathematical" treatise, starting in the past and advancing towards the future: "what has happened thus far agrees or disagrees with what we see; the two [past and present] together enlighten and shed light on the darkness of what we fear and hope; which helps immensely, as you know, for taking counsel".⁹² What underpinned this approach was a clearly enunciated political theory.

I consider that the State of the Low Countries, although it may have been ruled by Counts, Dukes and Kings, nevertheless retains a strongly popular character. I do not believe that either in the memory of ages past or in the present century is it possible to find a nation capable of serving as a sufficiently close example to represent your condition properly. And this is why the distinction between popular governments, those of the few, and the royal ones would not be adequate for the person who wishes to attain some knowledge of the state he plans to serve with profit: and I reckon that so many and such great differences come into play, that all the political doctrine that one finds in books is worthless in this case. The more so because such a diversity feeds through not only into the form of government, which is indeed infinitely diverse according to the laws, privileges, and situations of the country, but manifests itself even more strongly in the manners of the inhabitants, that is to say of the common people, of the nobles, dukes and princes one has to deal with. To such an extent that, in my opinion, one should not be astonished if those who have not thought about this, normally fill everything with confusion or with violence, when they least expect to fall into this.⁹³

⁹¹ *Lettre*, 73: "comblez de l'heur & aisance que vous peut apporter le commerce libre & voisinage d'un tel Royaume".

⁹² *Lettre*, 17: "ce qui est avny cy-devant approuve ou reprouve ce que nous voyons, & tous les deuz ensemble eclaircissent & donnent lumiere à l'obscurité de ce que nous craignons & esperons: ce qui sert, comme vous sçavez, infiniment pour prendre conseil". The author praises the method of the "Arithmeticiens".

⁹³ *Lettre*, 3-4: "Il m'est avis que l'Estat des païs bas, encor qu'il aye esté commandé par des Contes, Ducs & Roys, retient toutefois beaucoup du populaire. Et ne crois pas qu'il se trouvast ny en la memoire des aages passez, ny au siecle present, quelque nation qui peut servir d'exemple assez propre pour représenter bien vostre condition. Et c'est pourquoy la division des gouvernemens populaire, de peu, & royal ne seroit suffisante pour celuy qui

That the author of the *Lettre* saw the situation in the Low Countries as unprecedented and Aristotelian-Bodinian, tripartite division of constitutions as inapplicable to it has been noted elsewhere.⁹⁴ But the inapplicability is by no means total. The passage suggests that the Low Countries' divergence from the familiar model is only an aberration—an aberration for which the pamphlet goes on to account and which it proposes to solve. Political theory is only useless in this aberrant instance; history is not dismissed (the author goes on to use historical examples), it in fact illustrates the uniqueness of the current situation. Those who have not reflected on this “fill everything with confusion or with violence”. The passage quoted affirms at the outset that the state retains a popular character. The author continues by observing that, “your state is mixed, between on the one hand the authority of the one who is *seigneur*, and on the other the strength (*force*) of the people”.⁹⁵ This statement, written in Bodinian language is seemingly unBodinian in content. The author's description of the Low Countries, as a state shared between prince and people with “force” resting with the people, is similar to Bodin's in the letter to Trouilart. The statement is also immediately qualified, when the author for a second time observes that the state “nevertheless tends more towards the popular condition,” recalling Bodin's comments in the *République* on the possession of “force” by the people in such seemingly mixed states, discussed above.⁹⁶

The author then goes on to the second factor that Bodin was to single out: the weakness of the nobility. On the following page he accounts for the failure of monarchy in terms of the decline of the nobility (in turn, the result of commercial success): “Hence it happened, that the nobles who are the members and instruments of Monarchy, have been less powerful,” forcing princes to apply *douceur* through town magistrates rather than

veut entrer un peu avant en la conoissance de l'estat auquel il veut proffiter: & estime qu'il y entrevient tant & de si grandes differences, que toute la doctrine politicque qui se trouve dans les livres n'y serviroit rien. D'autant qu'un telle diversité n'eschoit pas seulement en la sorte du gouvernement, qui est toutefois infiniment divers selon les lois, privileges & situation du país, ains encor plus elle se rencontre es moeurs des peuples, c'est à dire du vulgaire, des nobles, Princes & Ducs à qui on a affaire. Tellement que mon opinion est, qu'il ne se faut esbahir si ceus qui ne considerent cecy, remplissent tout ordinairement de confusion ou de violence, lors que moins ils y pensent tomber”.

⁹⁴ Van Gelderen, *Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt*, 168.

⁹⁵ *Lettre*, 4: “Or pour revenir à vous autres, ie dy que vostre estat est meslé, & de l'autorité de celuy qui en est Seigneur, & de la force du peuple. Mais que toutefois il panche plus sur la condition populaire”.

⁹⁶ *Lettre*, 4: “Mais que toutefois il panche plus sur la condition populaire”.

enforce their will violently.⁹⁷ A third element, the danger of the enemy being “*maistre de la campagne*”, on which Bodin later wrote to Walsingham, recurs later with the same phrase being used.⁹⁸

The author emphasizes the differences within the Low Countries, implicitly applying climate theory to account for them. The county of Flanders is “the most full of great and populous towns”, possesses the least nobility and hence is the most resistant to the will of the *seigneurs*.⁹⁹ Hainaut and Artois differ not only in language but also in morals; its inhabitants are more warlike but also more resistant to popular, as opposed to royal authority. This is even more true for the inhabitants of Luxembourg and Burgundy, which are still further removed from the sea and commerce.¹⁰⁰ We have already seen Bodin, publicly and privately, comment on the rebellious nature and *légèreté* of the Flemings. In the *République*, he also observed that “all the ancients have remarked that the inhabitants of maritime places and great merchant towns are more cunning, more clever and more civil, than those removed from sea ports and commerce”, contrasting them with the masculine inhabitants of Tournai, in present-day Hainaut, whom Caesar had praised.¹⁰¹

There is a clear implication that this strange form of government needs to be explained. The author has found in a “*historiographe François*” that “the Flemish have always preferred their *seigneurs* weak rather than powerful”.¹⁰² “What has saved and maintained them, is to have had *seigneurs* who needed to establish and defend themselves, or who were so engaged elsewhere that they could not think of doing violence to their own people, or those who were so far removed that the length of the journey and the expenses necessarily incurred discouraged them from undertaking anything in this place”.¹⁰³ Their earlier rulers were weak and in need of foreign (French) assistance. Their treatment by the powerful Charles V would have been worse “if his ambition had not continually

⁹⁷ *Lettre*, 5: “Car de là il est avvenu, que les nobles qui sont les membres & instrumens de la Monarchie, ont esté les moindres en force”.

⁹⁸ *Lettre*, 38.

⁹⁹ *Lettre*, 7: “la plus pleine de villes grandes & populeuses”.

¹⁰⁰ *Lettre*, 8.

¹⁰¹ Bodin, *République* (1576), 539.

¹⁰² *Lettre*, 13: “Nous lisons en un historiographe François, un mot repeté souvent, à sçavoir que les Flamans ont tousiour plus aymé leurs Seigneurs foibles que puissans”.

¹⁰³ *Lettre*, 14: “ce qui les a sauvez & maintenuz, c'est d'avoir eu des Seigneurs qui avoient besoin de s'establiir, & se defendre, ou qui estoient si empeschez ailleurs, qu'ils ne pouvoient penser à violenter leur peuple: Ou qui encore estoient si éloignez que la longueur du voyage, & les frais qu'il falloit y employer les degouttoient d'entreprendre rien en cest endroit”.

occupied with many great schemes".¹⁰⁴ His son, having made his peace with France, had no such diversions. "It is thus a certain thing that your ancestors wisely foresaw, that they would have to endure their *seigneurs* if they were powerful, and that, in order to live at ease, the best method is to have them weak, or newly arrived, or exceedingly occupied with some great, difficult, and faraway enterprise".¹⁰⁵ The author, in other words, offered exceptional grounds to account for an abnormality; effective rulers would have made a monarchy out of the Netherlands.

The same qualities which make the inhabitants rebellious also make them leaderless. Native leaders, and especially the nobility that do exist, cannot be trusted: "several among them are quite willing to sell themselves, if they find a buyer".¹⁰⁶ In support of this advice, the author cites foreign examples: the expulsion of the nobility by the Swiss cantons, and the Venetian practice of appointing a foreigner (rather than one of their *seigneurs*) as captain of the army; the import of both cases is discussed at some length in the *République*.¹⁰⁷ But the author also twice draws attention to the disaster of Gembloux of 31 January 1578, the Spanish victory which had turned the tables against the rebels. A "good and recent example" of lack of leadership is "what happened to this army, which levied out of season, cost much doing nothing, and was broken not so much by enemies as by itself".¹⁰⁸ Elsewhere, the author refers to Gembloux as "a small loss of itself, but it nevertheless shattered and almost opened the gates of all your towns to the enemy".¹⁰⁹ Rudderless decision-making is set against distinctive, oppositional Flemish and Walloon identities, which led the author to draw two conclusions. First, the peculiar, unwarlike, yet

¹⁰⁴ *Lettre*, 15: "si son ambition ne l'eut embesoigné continuellement en beaucoup de grandes choses".

¹⁰⁵ *Lettre*, 16: "C'est donc chose asseuree, que voz predecesseurs ont sagement preveu, qu'est ce qu'ils avoient a endurer de leurs Seigneurs, s'ils estoient puissans, & que pour vivre à leur aise, le plus grand moyen est de les avoir foibles, ou nouvellement venuz, ou bien fort affairez à quelque grande, difficile & lointaine entreprise".

¹⁰⁶ *Lettre*, 28: "plusieurs d[']entre euz assez enclins à se vendre s'ils trouvent un acheteur".

¹⁰⁷ *Lettre*, 29: On the fate of the Swiss nobility, see Bodin, *République* (1576), 79–80, and on the importance of killing or expelling the entire nobility, see also Bodin, *République* (1576), 681; on the Venetian army, see Bodin, *République* (1576), 591.

¹⁰⁸ *Lettre*, 10: "En quoy peut servir de bon & recent exemple, ce qui s'est fait de c[']est armee, qui levee hors de saison, & ayant cousté infiniment sans rien faire, a esté non tant rompue des ennemis que de soy mesmes".

¹⁰⁹ *Lettre*, 18: "il y a quatre mois une perte de soy petite, mais qui toutefois ebranla, & quasi ouvrait à l'ennemy les portes de toutes voz villes". The pamphlet was finished on 1 June 1578 so the allusion to Gembloux is unmistakable.

rebellious Flemish character means “that one must always protect the Flemings as far as possible from receiving any blow of a staff, and keep them away from involvement in fighting, in order to obtain succour in exchange from their riches and abundance”.¹¹⁰ And second,

generally in respect of all the provinces and all those accidents, to which affairs are liable, it is very necessary that they should not have a leader who fears for his skin, in the manner of a vassal who fights against his master, and will be forced to abandon them at the first shock, loved by some in his prosperity, and hated by all in adversity. Instead a Prince who as if turning all the efforts and threats of the enemies against himself and his person, can transform civil tumult into a foreign war, and will be sufficiently strong to endure and compensate for various losses, with a constant and assured appearance.¹¹¹

In the *République*, Bodin had stressed the magnificence of just such a foreign prince, who—“as the great Hercules had done”—avenged an unjustly oppressed people.¹¹² For Bodin, however, even those subjects who *thought* about slaying their sovereign prince, even if he were a tyrant, were guilty of lèse-majesty.¹¹³ Bodin’s insistence on obedience, his direct opposition to the Huguenot monarchomachs, needs no elaboration here.¹¹⁴ But political theorists have also pointed that Bodin’s conception of sovereignty was—too—malleable.¹¹⁵

And so it is on this seemingly fundamental issue. As Bodin made quite clear in the *République*, obedience was owed only to a *sovereign* prince. “Because if [the prince] is not absolutely sovereign, it is necessary that the sovereignty belongs to the people, or else to the *seigneurs*. In this case there is no doubt that it is licit to proceed against the tyrant by way of

¹¹⁰ *Lettre*, 21: “il faut touiour garder le Flammant autant qu’il est possible de ne recevoir aucun coup de baston, & retirer d’euz le fais de la guerre, pour s’aider en contrechange de leur richesses & abondance”.

¹¹¹ *Lettre*, 21: “en general pour le respect de toutes les provinces, & pour tous evenemens, ausquels les choses sont sugettes, il leur est tres necessaire d’avoir non un chef qui à la façon du vassal qui combat contre son maistre, craigne sa peau, & soit contraint de les abandonner du premier coup, aymé des uns en sa prosperité, & hay de tous en son adversité. Ains un Prince qui comme tournant tout l’effort & menaces des ennemis rencontre soy & sa personne, face devenir le tumulte civil une guerre estrangere, & soit assez fort pour souffrir & reparer plusieurs pertes, avec constant & assureé visage”.

¹¹² Bodin, *République* (1576), 255: “comme fist le grand Hercules”. Repeated in [Jean Bodin], *Apologie de Rene Herpin pour la Republique de I. Bodin* (Paris, 1581), 4vo.

¹¹³ Bodin, *Republique* (1576), 257.

¹¹⁴ Skinner, *Foundations*, 2: 284–301.

¹¹⁵ Franklin, “Sovereignty”, 306.

justice... or to use violence and open force".¹¹⁶ Bodin's example of the deaths of Nero and Maximinus was based on the rather dubious grounds that "Roman emperors were nothing else than princes of the Republic".¹¹⁷ If one were to legitimate the Dutch Revolt in Bodinian terms therefore, one could only adopt the method employed in the *Lettre* by designating the Low Countries a popular state, explicitly labelling the ruler a tyrant, and (ideally) pressing for the intervention of a foreign prince. Among the reasons advanced for Anjou's cause were past French claims on Flanders and Artois: "The rights of sovereignty (*souveraineté*) which the house of France has always had over Flanders and Artois until the treaty of Madrid give *Monsieur* a sufficiently honest pretext to revenge the wrong that the Spaniard has done to his house".¹¹⁸ The *Lettre* here distinguished itself from its counterpart which maintained French claims.¹¹⁹ If the *Lettre* legitimates revolt in Bodinian terms, a pamphlet, written ostensibly five months earlier, advocated obedience to the Spanish crown in very similar language. It is to this pamphlet that we must now turn.

3. *Standing up for Loyalty:*

The Remonstrance aux Habitans du Païs Bas (1578)

The royal victory at Gembloux was, as the *Lettre* suggested, a game-changer, especially for Anjou. Mack Holt has linked Anjou's departure from court on 14 February 1578 directly to the defeat of the States army by Don Juan (Don John) of Austria, Farnese's predecessor as governor-general.¹²⁰ Anjou's overtures had so far been spurned, the States turning towards Archduke Matthias, a younger brother of the Emperor, instead. After Gembloux, Orange and Matthias, who had made his Joyous Entry only days earlier, hurriedly left Brussels for the safety of Antwerp. On 11 February an informant warned Don Juan's envoy in Paris, the Seigneur de Vaulx,

¹¹⁶ Bodin, *République* (1576), 255: "car s'il n'est pas absolument souverain, il est necessaire que la souveraineté soit au peuple, ou bien aux seigneurs. En ce cas il n'y a doute, qu'il ne soit licite de proceder contre le tyran, par voye de iustice, si on peut se prevaloir contre luy; ou bien par voye de fait & force ouverte, si autrement on ne peut se prevaloir contre luy".

¹¹⁷ Bodin, *République* (1576), 255: "les Empereurs Romains, n'estoyent rien autre chose, que Princes de la Republique".

¹¹⁸ *Lettre*, 54: "les droits de souveraineté que la maison de France a de tout tans eu sur le Flandre & Artois, iusques au traitté de Madril, donnent à Monsieur assez d'honeste preteste, pour revanger le torte que l'Espagnol tient à sa maison".

¹¹⁹ *Lettre contenant l'esclaircissement des actions...* (above, note 81), 57: "nous n'avons oublié les droits de souveraineté que noz Roys ont touiour eu sur la Flandre & Artois".

¹²⁰ Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, 96.

that the States-General were casting a second glance at Anjou, safe in the knowledge that he would not refuse.¹²¹ The dedicatory letter of the loyalist pamphlet that concerns us here, the *Remonstrance aux Habitans du País Bas* (1578), is dated 25 January 1578, and there is good reason to assume that it was written last.¹²² Bypassed by events as soon as it appeared, it seems to have gone unread by contemporaries and historians alike.

For the crown, Gembloux had marked a complete reversal of fortunes and it led to the abandonment of a strategy that had been adopted under duress. Cardinal de Granvelle, Philip's loyal but disgraced minister and an avid reader of pamphlets, had observed that there was a time for words and a time for war.¹²³ Yet, words had been forced upon the Governor: as Don Juan's envoy in Cologne observed in the autumn of 1577, if the Governor was unable to use weapons he could still fight with the pen and the tongue.¹²⁴ They were also a means to win time.¹²⁵ Since Don Juan's break with the States-General in July 1577, both sides had engaged in a polemic which was couched in the language of the Pacification of Ghent. Already, on 8 August, Don Juan's agent, the Sieur de Gomicourt, had announced to the loyal Council of Luxembourg the Governor's regret at witnessing the Prince of Orange "retire from the execution of the Pacification".¹²⁶ The pamphlet published by the States included intercepted letters which demonstrated that Don Juan had conspired with German mercenaries to seize the Antwerp fortress, implicitly and explicitly recalling the

¹²¹ Ch. Hirschauer, ed., *Correspondance secrète de Jean Sarrazin... avec la cour de Namur* (Arras: Rouard-Courtin, 1911), 12–15 (Letter 5).

¹²² The signature (sig. a2rv) and page numbering (pp. 3–4) of the dedicatory letter (the work is dedicated in ironic fashion to the Prince of Orange) is identical to that of the subsequent page, suggesting that it was inserted last. It is included in only one of the five copies I have seen.

¹²³ Granvelle to Margaret of Parma, 21 February 1578: Edmond Poulet and Charles Piot, eds., *Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 1565–1586*, 12 vols. (Brussels: Commission royale d'histoire, 1877–1896), 7: 41–44 (Letter 15), here 42: "Quant l'on vient à l'exécution des armes, les papiers cessent."

¹²⁴ Jean Fonck to Don Juan, 30 November 1577: Joseph Lefèvre, ed., *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, 2nd series, 1 (Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 1940), 140 (Letter 221).

¹²⁵ Don Juan told the king that his principal objective was "ganar tiempo en todo": Don Juan to Philip II, 20 October 1577: Baltasar Porreño, *Historia del Serenísimo Señor D. Juan de Austria* (Madrid: La sociedad de bibliófilos españoles, 1899), 497 (Letter 58).

¹²⁶ *Remonstrance faite par le Sieur de Gomicourt, de la part de son Altesse, aux Gouverneur, President, & gens du Conseil de sa Maiesté, Estatz du Pays & Duché de Luxembourg* (s.l., [1577]), sig. A3vo: "Mais trop tost (au grand regret de son Altesse) l'on a remarqué par signes infallibles, combien ledict Prince d'Orange se retiroit de la conclusion de ladicté pacification". The oration was repeated in front of the States of Luxembourg on 19 August.

nightmare which had originally motivated the Pacification, the Spanish Fury—as would Anjou’s debacle, the “French Fury”, five years later. The *Discours sommier* made a mockery of Don Juan; the fact that he sold the contents of his wine cellar made it clear that the Governor never planned to return to Brussels.¹²⁷ In reply, Don Juan’s followers composed the *Veritable récit*, again pointing to Orange’s infractions of the Pacification. The work appeared, as one of the governor’s supporters noted, “under the name of Don Juan”, and with a royal privilege (dated 11 December 1577); this was the regime’s official reply.¹²⁸ The loyalist position was so dire that no native printer could be found and the work had to be printed in Verdun.¹²⁹

The *Discours sommier* and the *Veritable récit* mark the official line adopted by both sides and were intended for both domestic and international consumption. Both sides sent copies for distribution at the court in Paris, and the States General sent copies as far away as Portugal.¹³⁰ Certainly these were not the only works to appear. For instance, private correspondence links Don Juan to a pseudonymous, yet sycophantic, pamphlet which called for the names of Don Juan’s followers to be etched “on every immortal soul to serve as a model and mark of fidelity to the whole world”.¹³¹ But they do indicate a certain agenda against which other works can be measured. In the wake of the *Discours sommier*, for instance, a whole genre of collections of real and invented letters developed.¹³²

¹²⁷ [Marnix], *Discours sommier*, 17.

¹²⁸ Martin Antoine Delrio, *Mémoires de Martin Antoine Del Rio sur les troubles des Pays-Bas durant l'administration de Don Juan d'Autriche, 1576–1578*, ed. & trans. Adolphe Delvigne, 3 vols. (Brussels: Muquardt, 1869–71), 3:36. “Austriaci nomine”. *Veritable récit des choses passees es Pays Bas, depuis la venue du Seigneur Don Iehan d'Austrice* (Luxembourg [Verdun?], 1577) [Knuttel no. 315a], sig. x2.

¹²⁹ Monica Stensland, “Habsburg communication in the Dutch revolt, 1567–1609” (DPhil dissertation, University of Oxford, 2008), 164 (recently published by Amsterdam University Press).

¹³⁰ Acts of the States-General, 14 December 1577: Louis Prosper Gachard, ed., *Actes des États-Généraux*, 1 (Brussels: Muquardt, 1861), 299 (number 933); on the distribution of both pamphlets at the French court, see the reports to Don Juan, reprinted in Pouillet and Piot, eds., *Granvelle*, 6: 570–72, 6: 605 (Letters 210 and 229).

¹³¹ *Apologie contre certain discours emis soubz le nom des etats generaux des Pays bas* (s.l., [1577]) [Knuttel no. 316], 64–5: “graver sur quelque l[']ame immortelle pour servir de patron & marque de fidelité à tout le monde”.

¹³² For example, *Epistres Beligiques: par lesquelles est discoursu de la cause & du progres des Troubles, qui de present regnent en Flandre* (Reims, 1578) [this work does appear to be a genuine production, written by an aide to Don Juan and printed by the Reims-based printer Jean de Foigny]; and the rebuttal with invented replies, *Lettres d'advertissement a la noblesse et aultres deputez des estats generaux du Pais Bas* (Frankfurt [=Antwerp], 1578) [Knuttel no. 349], with the running title “Epistres antibeligiques”.

In contrast, the author of the *Remonstrance* had read both official pamphlets but took a very different approach.¹³³ Its author was no typical loyalist: no loyalist would inform the reader that Philip's other kingdoms would be happy for the Netherlands to go their own way.¹³⁴ Similarly, while loyalists saw the Pacification as a troubling document that Don Juan nevertheless upheld, the *Remonstrance* declared that the governor was "the only author of the Pacification of Ghent".¹³⁵ Don Juan had been absent from the negotiations; the comment makes sense only within Bodinian political theory (where the agreement would not be valid without royal assent), not as part of official propaganda. I argue that the *Remonstrance* offers us an alternative (earlier) Bodinian viewpoint of the Revolt; it is, in a sense, the *République* in miniature and a case study.

As with the previous pamphlet, the *Remonstrance* appeared ostensibly at Reims. The name of the printer, Nicolas Martin, is fictitious. The printer's mark points to Lyon as the place of publication.¹³⁶ Only four works were published under this pseudonym, one of which was a copy of the treaty that Anjou had signed with the States six months later—possibly more than a coincidence.¹³⁷ The author's name, Braechmus Danuis Seigneur of Hilorue (which does not in fact exist), appears to offer no clues, but the text itself suggests, once more, French authorship. The author uses French terms and republishes a letter by the Turk praising Don Juan which had originally been published in Paris.¹³⁸ The author considers the

¹³³ Braechmus Danuis [pseud.], *Remonstrance aux habitans du Pais Bas, declarant amplement les vrais moyens pour les induire à demeurer constans en leurs deüë obeissance* (Reims, 1578) [Knuttel no. 383], 41, 45.

¹³⁴ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 26.

¹³⁵ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 29: "seul auteur de la pacification".

¹³⁶ Sybille von Gültlingen, ed., *Répertoire bibliographique des livres imprimés en France au seizième siècle*, vol. 5 (Baden-Baden & Bouxwiller: Éditions Valentin Koerner, 1996), 252; Georges Lepreux, *Gallia Typographica*, série départementale, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1911), 289–90. The device is a variant of the *fleur-de-lis* which belonged to the Lyon-based printer Jacques Moderne (fl. 1539–1548) and may have been used by his heirs. I am grateful to Malcolm Walsby of the French Vernacular Book Project for this reference. See also the reproduction of this device in Denis Guérin, *Introduction à la lecture des marques typographiques* (Paris: Association Limage, 1977), 65 (no. 208).

¹³⁷ I am indebted to Malcolm Walsby who originally pointed me to this particular version of the *Accord et alliance*. The other two pamphlets, entries 34897 and 19697 in the Universal Short Title Catalogue, appeared in Vienne in 1573, and in Lyon in 1597 respectively. The printer pseudonyms of the two *Lettres* discussed above had similarly been used before. Presumably such names circulated through book fair catalogues. Universal Short Title Catalogue (University of St Andrews), <http://www.ustc.ac.uk>.

¹³⁸ For example, the reference to the "parlement" of Mechlin (Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 9); the references to "les tailles & gabelle" (Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 239); and the letter "imprimee à Paris en l'an 1572", re-printed in Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 31–2.

current Netherlandish obsession with enriching oneself at the expense of other people's property (incidentally, the hallmark of a Bodinian popular state) to be "very different from what I perceived amongst you, during my studies".¹³⁹ The most significant personal detail is the record of a meeting with "the ambassador to [Philip II] from some other great King [who] has told me (God is my witness) that the virtuous actions of his Catholic majesty compelled him to accord the latter the reputation of a true saint".¹⁴⁰ Given that the only king, apart from Philip, praised in this account is the King of France, the anecdote appears to imply familiarity with the French court.¹⁴¹

The aim of the *Remonstrance* was to set out, in a form reminiscent of the *République*, what the best sort of government looked like, before demonstrating that the inhabitants of the Low Countries possessed this form and therefore had no cause to rebel. It is, of course, a much shorter treatise than the *République* and the author regularly refers to the need for brevity. He does not have time to discuss "the success of your ancestors before the union of your lands under one superior, or the sort of religion they held before the reception of the Christian faith", and other such things.¹⁴² He also notes how "the brevity of this *discours* does not permit me to treat at great length how justice has at all time been administered amongst you".¹⁴³ Despite this brevity though, the author offers a fully-fledged political theory:

We must then understand first of all that it is indisputable that among the three sorts of government, namely the Democratic or popular, Aristocratic or that of a number of nobles, and the Monarchic, that is to say the

¹³⁹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 18: "Ce qui est grandement different à ce que i'ay congneu autresfois entre vous, pendant mes estudes". The author does not state *where* his studies took place; he could have met Netherlandish students at any major European university. It is the distinction between himself and the Netherlanders that is relevant here.

¹⁴⁰ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 14: "Ambassadeur vers sa maiesté pour quelque autre grand Roy, m[']ja compté (Dieu m'en est tesmoing) que les vertueuses actions de sa maiesté Catholique Le contraignoient de le reputer un vray saintc." The same ambassador also reported that the king's servants live "comme s'ilz estoient Religieux en un Monastere bien reiglé".

¹⁴¹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 32 where the author declares that there is no prince "mieux suivy de Noblesse" than Don Juan "exceptez l'Empereur, le Roy de France & le Roy Catholique son frere".

¹⁴² Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 4: "le succez de voz ancestres devant l'union de voz pays soubz un superieur, ny quelle sorte de Religion ilz ont tenue devant la reception de la foy Chrestienne".

¹⁴³ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 9: "La briefueté de ce discours ne me permet de traicter plus au long, avec quel ordre la Iustice a esté de tout temps administrée entre vous".

government of one person, the monarchic is thought the best and the most in conformity as much with divine law (which commands us to obey one single God), as with the law of nature, as the honey bees demonstrate in following one of them as their King.¹⁴⁴

It is only since 1525 (*i.e.* since the battle of Pavia) that the Netherlands have enjoyed the blessed state of being united under a single ruler.¹⁴⁵

Kingship began with the original institution of kings, as a defence of the poor against the rich.¹⁴⁶ The discussion then sought to prove that Philip II possessed the necessary virtues more than any other prince in the past 300 years—the reference here is to Saint Louis of France.¹⁴⁷ There are only “two ways of holding subjects in obedience, namely by love or by fear”, with Philip ruling by the former. Here too we can see echoes of the *République*. A passage from the text used to substantiate the institution of kings, Cicero’s *De officiis*, features prominently as the motto of the 1577 Genevan

¹⁴⁴ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 4–5: “il nous faut donc entendre premierement qu’il est hors de toute controverse qu’entre les trois sortes de gouvernemens. Assavoir Democratique ou populaire, Aristocratique, ou celui d’un nombre de nobles, & Monarchique, c’est à dire le gouvernement d’une personne. Le Monarchique est estimé le principal, & le plus conforme tant au droict divin, (qui nous commande d’obeyr à un seul Dieu,) que à la loy de nature (comme les mouches a miel, nous demonstrent en suivant l’un d’entre eux comme leur Roy)”. The passage recalls Bodin, *République* (1576), 219: “il n’y a que trois estats, ou trois sortes de Republics, asçavoir la monarchie, l’Aristocratie, & la Democratie”; and the analogies made in *République* (1576), 695–96, where “ce grand monde . . . n’a qu’un Dieu souverain,” and “iusques aux animaux sociables, nous voyons qu’ils ne peuvent souffrir plusieurs Roys”.

¹⁴⁵ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 5: “Et combien que plusieurs de voz pays ayent esté tousiours quasi regiz par telle sorte de gouvernement: toutesfois c’est de nostre temps que vous estes parvenuz a ceste grande felicité, que d’estre reüniz ensemble & subiectz a un seul superieur, (signamnt la Flandre depuis l’an 1525) ce qui à retranché les guerres immortelles accoustumées entre vous”.

¹⁴⁶ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 11–12: Cf. Bodin, *République* (1576), 50, 234, 238–45. The treatment of the origins of kingship in the *Remonstrance* is inconsistent with Bodin’s complicated discussion of the subject, possibly on account of the pamphlet’s brevity. It is true that Bodin refutes the theory that “les premiers Roys ont esté choisiz pour leur iustice & vertu” (*République* (1576), 50) which he attributes to Cicero and others, who had been misled by Herodotus. According to Bodin the first monarchies were seigneurial and the first kings *seigneurs*, “gouvernant ses sugets comme le pere de famille ses esclaves” (*République*, 234). Yet, it is only when a seigneur restores the liberty of his subjects that “de seigneur il devient Roy, & change la Monarchie seigneurale en Royale” (*République*, 239). Kings may be elected for their virtue or for their beauty (240) or obtain their crown in a myriad of other ways; it is the appropriate exercise of his office that makes a sovereign a king. The discrepancy could be accounted for by a professed need for brevity (see below, note 150).

¹⁴⁷ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 10. See Bodin, *République* (1576), 561 for the jurist’s praise of St Louis. It is perhaps also worth noting that in Jean Bodin, *Lettre de monsieur Bodin* (Paris, 1590), 8, Philip II is described as “sans flaterie, le plus grand Prince portant titre de Roy, qui fut il y a cinq cens ans en la Chrestienté”.

pirate edition of the *République*, and Bodin relied on the *De officiis* in his discussion of the division of wealth between rich and poor.¹⁴⁸ It is among those alluded to and paraphrased in the pamphlet¹⁴⁹—“without amusing myself with what is written in the Old Testament and by some authors on this subject”.¹⁵⁰ The idea that Philip’s governors sought to establish a tyranny is dismissed.¹⁵¹ Subjects have simply abused Philip’s “douceur” and committed rebellions “as much against God as against your Prince, to the great detriment of your Commonwealth”.¹⁵²

The political theory set out, and its application to the Low Countries, were buttressed, like Bodin’s, by historical analysis and by astrology. In the pamphlet’s opening lines the author claims that key to avoiding the loss of body, soul and goods, was “the understanding of histories, which, together with experience, shows clearly that nothing is constant in this terrestrial word, which is not subject to some change, except the word of God”.¹⁵³ The author repeatedly argues that historical comparisons must be placed in their appropriate geographical contexts: “One must understand that men, well-versed in *histoires*, have remarked that those who exist under a similar climate are similarly subject to the same events, whether it be in matters of religion or other such things”.¹⁵⁴ Given what has happened in Germany, France, England, and Scotland, it is not surprising to see the same happening in the Low Countries. Elsewhere, the author

¹⁴⁸ Jean Bodin, *Les Six livres de la republique de Bodin Angevin* ([Geneva], 1577), sig. ¶6vo. On Jean Bodin and the Roman theory of justice, see Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 99.

¹⁴⁹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 14.

¹⁵⁰ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 11: “sans m’amuser à ce qui est escrit au vieil Testament, & par aucuns autheurs sur tel subiect”. Emphasis added. It is the example of Nimrod, grandson of Ham, in Genesis 10 that led Bodin to disagree with Cicero: see Bodin, *République* (1576), 50.

¹⁵¹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 15.

¹⁵² Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 15: “tant contre Dieu que contre vostre Prince, au grand detriement de vostre Republique”.

¹⁵³ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 3 [the second page 3]: “afin d’éviter l’apparente perte, tant de voz ames, que de voz corps & biens: (comme tous ceux qui iadis se sont rebellez contre Dieu & leur Prince, & continué iusques à la mort ont expérimenté) Il faut entendre, que le seul moyen pour remedier à tels inconueniens, consiste (apres la sainte escripture) en l’intelligence des histoires, lesquelles, avec l’experience, demonstrent evidemment, qu’il n’y a rien de constant en ce monde terrestre, qui ne soit subiect à quelque changement, excepté la parole de Dieu”.

¹⁵⁴ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 17: “Il faut entendre que les hommes bien versez és histoires, ont remarqué que ceux qui sont soubz un mesme climat sont communément subiectz à mesmes accidens, soit en matiere de Religion, ou autres semblables accidens”.

remarks that “you are infinitely indebted to God for having established religion so well in your country through so great a number of holy martyrs that you are the last of your neighbours *under the same climate* to have been instructed in the evil doctrine of Machiavelli”.¹⁵⁵ The Netherlanders could not be like the Free Cities of the Empire, “because they are robust and nourished by war and, besides, they are surrounded for the most part by high mountains, not bordering upon such neighbours as yours”.¹⁵⁶ The *République* had maintained that mountainous cities were more likely to rebel than cities on plains.¹⁵⁷

The pamphlet’s interest in history is paired with one in astrology. The inhabitants of the Low Countries could be certain of punishment, in the light of histories and experience of the present, “but also through the revolutions of the stars while the secret judgments of God are reserved to His divine power”.¹⁵⁸ Elsewhere, the author refers to the “several wise men of our time” who have studied “judicial astrology”.¹⁵⁹ It is not implausible to read these references to contemporary scholarship and scholars as references to Bodin. In the *République*, Bodin argued that the best way to end civil unrest was for “a virtuous and wise man, who has gained a reputation of honour and justice” to bring people back to reason, and if necessary, for a wise foreigner to interpose himself.¹⁶⁰ Given these references to Bodin’s thought, it seems more than likely that the French author of the *Remonstrance* sought to put into practice what Bodin had preached.

¹⁵⁵ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 5: “vous estes infiniment obligez a Dieu, pour l’avoir si bien plantée en voz païs, par un si grand nombre de saincts martirs, & de ce que vous estes les derniers de voz voisins souz un mesme climat, à estre instruitz en la meschante doctrine de Machiavel . . . qu’il est necessaire à celuy qui voudroit usurper l’Empire ou iurisdiction d’autruy, de prendre quelque religion”.

¹⁵⁶ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 26: “Car ils sont robustes, & nourris à la guerre: & outre ils sont environnez la plus part de haultes montaignes, non aboutissans à tels voisins que vous”.

¹⁵⁷ Bodin, *République* (1576), 516.

¹⁵⁸ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 49: “tant par la revolution des Astres, encores que les iugemens secretz de Dieu soient reservez à sa puissance divine”. See Bodin’s defence of “la recherche des astres” in Bodin, *République*, 429–30.

¹⁵⁹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 23: “plusieurs doctes hommes de nostre temps”; “Astrologie iudiciaire”. Bodin employs the phrase “astrologie iudiciaire” only in his [Bodin], *Apologie de Rene Herpin*, 26vo.

¹⁶⁰ Bodin, *République* (1576), 508: “un vertueux & sage homme qui ayt gaigné la reputation d’honneur & Iustice”.

4. *Postscript*

The *Remonstrance* offers more than a restatement of the theories of the *République*; it appears also to recapture Bodin's heterodox religious views. An emphasis on atonement runs throughout the work. The *Remonstrance* observes that "our Churchmen" are in what concerns their morals "contra-vening almost directly in all things their original institution", so much so that there is "a great need for a good reformation" to move God to have pity upon us.¹⁶¹ Even William of Orange is told, with reference to the biblical example of Nebuchadnezzar, that "God does not refuse mercy to him who asks it with contrition in his heart and repentance of his offences".¹⁶² The author tells the inhabitants of the Low Countries that they knew "that the only way towards your tranquillity is to repent of your sins, cry for pardon from God and keep to the last Pacification".¹⁶³ Failure, the author threatens, would lead to a fate out of the Old Testament—and similar to that outlined in the *Lettre*: "Your lands and goods will be taken over by strangers and the most beautiful of your women and daughters will be conjoint onto them and thus mix their race with a foreign one".¹⁶⁴ Their fate will be worse than that of the Jews, "from whose posterity a number is still alive, living among the other nations, keeping to their original religion".¹⁶⁵

In this chapter I have taken Bodin's changing perspective on the Dutch Revolt as my starting point, arguing that Bodin's application of the theories of the *République*—on which he draws explicitly in his correspondence—could offer a standard by which to measure the application (or reception) of these theories in two, at first sight very different, pamphlets. It would be difficult to argue that these two pamphlets, written shortly after the publication of the *République*, did not, at the very least, demonstrate its reception. Yet, their study raises questions of authorship as well. Was the

¹⁶¹ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 6: "speciallement noz gens d'Eglise en ce qui concerne leurs moeurs, contrevenans quasi directement en toutes choses à leur premiere institution que nous avons grand besoing d'une beau reformation pour emouvoir Dieu avoir pitié de nous".

¹⁶² Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 3–4: "Dieu ne refuse sa misericorde à celuy qui la demande avec contrition de cueur & repentance de ses offences".

¹⁶³ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 49: "vous congnoistrez que l'unique moyen de vostre repos est de vous repentir de voz pechez, & crier pardon à Dieu".

¹⁶⁴ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 51: "& seront leurs terres & biens possédez des estrangers... & demeureront les plus belle de leurs femmes & fills pour estre conioinctes avec eux: & ainsi mesler leur race avec l'estrangiere".

¹⁶⁵ Danuis, *Remonstrance*, 49: "de la posterité desquelz il y a encores quelque nombre en vie, frequentans parmy les autres nations, & gardans leur premiere religion".

Anjou supporter who composed the *Lettre* possibly French? Is it possible that Bodin himself or a colleague wrote in support of Anjou? Might it be possible that, prior to Anjou's involvement, Bodin himself practised what he had preached? (And if not Bodin, who did?) In the case of the *Remonstrance* especially, I would submit that its author might seem to have received Bodin's religious views rather well.¹⁶⁶ As Ann Blair elsewhere in this volume points out, contemporaries did not readily recognize Bodin's authorship of the *Apologie de René Herpin*.¹⁶⁷ Equally, the significance of Bodin's anecdote about his friend's guardian angel was not realised until the twentieth century.¹⁶⁸ Bodin's known use of pseudonyms means that the hypothesis cannot be instantly dismissed, nor should we expect a Bodinian work to have been instantly recognized by his contemporaries.

Authorship raises additional questions that cannot be addressed here—problems of which Bodin scholars, in particular, are well aware. *Too much* reception could, in the opinion of some, even denote forgery.¹⁶⁹ If the two pamphlets are Bodin's, they could in turn shed further light on the Angevin's intellectual developments explored in the first part of this chapter. The arguments expressed in both pamphlets appear to fit this trajectory well. Bodin's original opinion of the Low Countries, as a territory only recently united under monarchical rule, finds expression in the *Remonstrance*. There are similarities between Bodin's diagnosis of the Low Countries in the letter to Trouillart and the *Lettre*; only the proposed cure differs. Bodin had sought to reconcile both his opposition to the Crown at the Estates-General in 1576 and his support for the Catholic League in the late 1580s with political theory. The *Lettre* justifies Anjou's involvement in the Low Countries in terms that the jurist may have found acceptable. In this tentative reading, Bodin, having witnessed Anjou's failure, came to regard popular rule rather than the involvement

¹⁶⁶ The issue of Bodin's religion remains a matter of debate, and I do not mean to pretend that the debate has been settled. I am here only pointing to the emphasis on the atonement of sin and an interest in Judaism, elements one might not expect from a Catholic loyalist. On Bodin's religion, see especially Paul L. Rose, *Bodin and the Great God of Nature: The Moral and Religious Universe of a Judaizer* (Geneva: Droz, 1980).

¹⁶⁷ See above, pp. 142–4.

¹⁶⁸ On Bodin's daemon, see Robin Briggs, "Dubious Messengers: Bodin's Daemon, the Spirit World and the Sadducees", in *Angels in the Early Modern World*, ed. Peter Marshall and Alexandra Walsham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 168–90.

¹⁶⁹ The reference here is, of course, to the recent debate surrounding the authorship of the *Colloquium Heptaplomeres*. On this, see especially Noel Malcolm, "Jean Bodin and the Authorship of the 'Colloquium Heptaplomeres'", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 69 (2006): 95–150.

of a foreign prince as more agreeable to the customs of the inhabitants and the country's climate.

Ultimately, whether the pamphlets were written by Bodin himself or by followers, one conclusion can certainly be drawn. For the only sensible advice they could communicate to Anjou was to stay well away from this bastardised polity, the very nature of which led necessarily to continual instability. Were matters otherwise, the theory itself would have to be abandoned: a concession of defeat which philosophers have found it much easier to avoid than have political and military leaders.